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NOTE




On the night of Wednesday, August 9, 2006, John White, a fifty-three-
year-old asphalt company laborer shot and killed seventeen-year-old Daniel
Cicciaro Jr. on the front lawn of White's house in suburban Miller Place,
Long Island.'
While the events that precipitated the shooting remain clouded in con-
troversy, it is uncontested that earlier that evening Cicciaro had argued vio-
lently with White's teenage son, Aaron.2 After learning from a friend's sister
that she thought Aaron intended to rape her, Cicciaro had gone into a
drunken rage, had threatened Aaron over the phone, and had driven with
four friends (one armed with a baseball bat) to White's house.3 The elder
White left his house armed with a pistol and shot Cicciaro after a heated,
profanity-laced exchange.
4
There was no allegation that Cicciaro produced a weapon,5 and, unlike
more than twenty other states,6 New York does not have an expansive "cas-
tle doctrine" of self-defense on which White could rely. In other words, in
New York, the fact that Cicciaro threateningly entered White's property
without permission did not grant White a prima facie right to resort to deadly
force.7 As a result, White's defense rested on convincing a Suffolk County
* B.A., Yale University, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2011. Many
thanks to Carol Steiker for her comments on earlier drafts and invaluable support throughout
the writing process, as well as to Janet Halley for her suggestions and advice. I am also thank-
ful to Harvard Law School, which funded this project through its Summer Academic Fellow-
ship Program.
' For a detailed account of the facts (both disputed and undisputed) of the shooting, see
Calvin Trillin, The Color of Blood: Race, memory, and a killing in the suburbs, NEW YORKER,
Mar. 3, 2008, at 30-39.
21 d. at 31-32.
3Id. at 33.
4 See id. at 34.
See id. at 32.
6 Cf National Rifle Association ("NRA") Inst. for Legislative Action, Nebraska: Castle
Doctrine, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/InTheNews.aspx?ID = 13415.
7 New York does recognize a weak form of the common law castle doctrine, but unlike
more expansive recent castle law statutes, it still requires proof that the home dweller's fear of
the intruder's imminent violent behavior was reasonable. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (Mc-
Kinney 2004). Further, it does not presume a threat of imminent violence based on the intru-
sion alone. See § 35.15.
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jury that he reasonably feared for his own (and his family's) safety.' White
had good reason to feel threatened, his attorney insisted, in large part be-
cause of his race.9 Unlike 99.5% of the population of Miller Place, and un-
like Cicciaro and his friends, White was black. 0 Even more important in the
eyes of the defense was the fact that White's ancestors had been chased from
their Alabama home by members of the Ku Klux Klan, causing White to
associate the aggressive incursion of white men with a legacy of intense
racial violence."
Rooted firmly in this narrative of racial conflict and raising questions of
how integrated Long Island really was, the trial attracted tremendous media
coverage and public attention. 2 Cicciaro's friends and family demanded ven-
geance and loudly denounced the allegations that race had played a signifi-
cant role in the confrontation and homicide. 3 In White's defense, civil rights
activists led by Reverend Al Sharpton decried what they viewed as an at-
tempted modem day lynching,14 while advocates of gun rights and self-de-
fense claimed that White had been acting in the necessary defense of his and
his family's lives and honor.'5 In 2007, White was ultimately convicted of
manslaughter by a jury with one black member and sentenced to a prison
term of two to four years, which he is serving as of this writing. 6
This Note does not begin its exploration of the castle doctrine with the
case of John White to suggest that the doctrine would necessarily have re-
sulted in White's exoneration. There is, in fact, reason to believe the prosecu-
tion could have successfully refuted such a defense; based on the evidence, a
reasonable jury could have concluded that White went out of his way to
leave his house to confront the youths, and it is unclear whether Cicciaro and
his friends were actually on White's property at the time of the shooting."'
Rather, this case serves as an instructive starting point because it demon-
8 See Trillin, supra note 1, at 34.
'See Nicholas Hirshon et al., Guilty Verdict for Black Dad in Shooting Death of White
Teen on Long Island, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 23, 2007, available at http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/ny-crime/2007/12/22/2007-12-22-guilty.Yerdict for-black-dad-in_
shooting.html.
0 See Trillin, supra note 1, at 30.
See id. at 35-36.
,2 See infra notes 14-16,
'3 See Trillin, supra note 1, at 32.
"4 See John Lauinger & Carrie Melago, Sharpton, John White Rally Protesters after Long
Island Race-Slay Verdict, N.Y. DAuLy NEWS, Jan. 6, 2008, available at http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/nycrime/2008/01/06/2008-01-06-sharpton-john-white-rally-protestersaft-
I html.
" See, e.g., Cyd Malone, The Tragedy of John White, NEwsLI.coM, Oct. 14, 2008, http:H
www.newsli.com/2008/10/14/the-tragedy-of-john-white/.
6 See, e.g., Selim Algar, Dad of Slay Victim Rages: Livid at Wrist Slap, N.Y. POST, Mar.
20, 2008, at 11. Following the rendering of the verdict, there were numerous allegations that
jurors felt coerced (at times due to violent behavior by other jurors) to find White guilty.
Interestingly, jurors claimed that for a long stretch before they reached consensus, the vote had
been ten to two. See Patrick Whittle & Erik German, Jury in John White Trial Boiled with
Tension, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 2008.
'" See Trillin, supra note 1, at 35.
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strates the complexity of self-defense in the home and highlights the cultural
and political conflicts and unexpected alliances that the debate over its appli-
cation evokes.
The goal of this Note is to explore the current discourse surrounding the
castle doctrine. White's case seems to subvert and perhaps even invert many
of the assumptions about the doctrine. First, critics of the castle doctrine
frequently argue that there is no reason to legislate a specific defense for
homeowners who shoot home invaders because there is rarely support for
the victims or pressure to prosecute the homeowners. 8 In this case, however,
Cicciaro's family and friends were some of the most vocal players in the
proceeding. 19 Also, in this case, the traditional victims' rights procedural ele-
ment-victim impact statements at sentencing-were used to try to increase
the punishment for the homeowner, making the intruder, instead of the home
dweller, the victim in the victims' rights paradigm. 20 Finally, rather than
evoking the socially conservative image of the culturally dominant white
frontiersman, this case summons up the image of the Southern black be-
sieged by a murderous posse. Here the castle doctrine serves as a potentially
antimajoritarian defense, or a possible means by which the law might level
the playing field between the marginalized and the marginalizer.
Despite these unusual elements, the coverage and controversy over
White's conviction is far from unique in the current landscape of criminal
prosecutions. 21 The last decade has seen increased support for and adoption
of castle doctrine-based laws.2 2 The passage of such laws and subsequent
uses of the defense have captured the public imagination, prompting signifi-
cant media attention, as well as skeptical and critical scholarship from the
legal academic community. 23 While there has been an increase in similar
8 See, e.g., Emily Ramshaw, Bills Would Arm Owners with Deadly Force Right, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/
news/texassouthwest/stories/022807dntexcastle.3abaea7.htm ("'We already have excellent
self-defense laws in Texas,' said Marsha McCartney, president of the North Texas Brady Cam-
paign, which seeks to curb gun violence. 'They act like they're fixing some big problem, like
people defending themselves are going to jail. And that's just not the case."'); Nathan Thorn-
burgh, Looking Kindly on Vigilante Justice, TIME, Jul. 3, 2008, available at http://
www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1820028,00.html.
19 See, e.g., Algar, supra note 16.
20 Compare id. ("Despite pleas from Cicciaro's folks to impose the maximum, the judge
opted for a lower sentence .... "), with John Moritz, Stronger Self-Defense Law Backed, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 1, 2007, at B 1 ("Crime victims [sic] rights groups and the
National Rifle Association have expressed support for the [proposed castle doctrine statute],
saying it would tag the intruder as the sole criminal in such matters and not the property
owner.").
21 See Chris Joyner, Taking Up Arms Against Intruders: 'Castle Doctrine' Laws, Justifying
the Use of Deadly Force on Home Turf Gain Ground, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2007, at A3.
22 See Renee Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in
Self-Defense Law, 2 J.L. EcON. & POL'y 331, 333 (2006) ("A popular revolt against certain
notions of proportionality has been underway for the past several decades in the United States,
and for at least the past five years abroad.").
23 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of
Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1999); Lemer,
2010]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
legislation in Europe,24 the primary focus of scholarship has been on the
adoption of the doctrine in the United States, specifically the South and
West.25 Critics have frequently focused on the conservative cultural politics
of these regions, linking supporters of the castle doctrine to vigilantism and
tracing their support to a reactionary frontier mythos.26 Further, much of the
literature surrounding these laws (from both supporters and detractors) tends
to characterize enactment of castle laws as an extension of both the victims'
rights movement and a theory of compensatory justice.27
Considering the current prevalence of castle laws and the often po-
larized nature of the debate concerning their application, it is important to
excavate the doctrine from the culture wars rhetoric in which it has been
mired. This Note contends that the current discourse has become too firmly
rooted in the overly reductive, potentially fallacious dichotomy of American
political partisanship. It aims to link the castle doctrine's moral and philo-
sophical underpinnings to those of more broadly accepted self-defense doc-
trines, to examine the potentially harmful and unexpected consequences of
supra note 22; Dirk Johnson, 'Make My Day': More Than a Threat, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1990,
at A14; Editorial, Trigger-Happy: A Gun Bill Seeks to Fix a Law that Isn't Broken, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 29, 2009, at B2 (arguing that a proposed Pennsylvania castle doctrine
statute "would be an open invitation to needless trouble and it would complicate the lives of
police officers ... all because of the guns-are-supreme mentality pushed by the National Rifle
Association (which supports the bill) and others").
24 See Lemer, supra note 22, at 344-53 (describing analogous legislation in Europe and
public demand for such laws in other countries).
25 Cf RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, No DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1991) (tracing concepts of duty to retreat through a history
of Western frontier gunfights and gunfighters); Denise M. Drake, The Castle Doctrine: An
Expanding Right to Stand Your Ground, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 573, 577-85 (2008) (historicizing
the castle doctrine in Texas in light of descriptions of the doctrine as promoting "Wild West"
values); P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Associa-
tion-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35
S.U. L. REv. 1, 18-28 (2007) (discussing Florida's and Alabama's legislative rejection of a
duty to retreat and citing other mostly southern states' similar legislative actions); J.P. Ney-
land, Note, A Man's Car Is His Castle: The Expansion of Texas' "Castle Doctrine" Eliminating
the Duty to Retreat in Areas Outside the Home, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 719, 727-35 (2008)
(describing the evolution of Texas's self-defense legislation).
26 See, e.g., Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat
and Encourages Citizens to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REv. 339, 363-65 (2007);
Elaine M. Chiu, Culture in Our Midst, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 244-47 (2006); Dan
M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999); Steven P.
Aggergaard, Case Note, Retreat from Reason: How Minnesota's New No-Retreat Rule Con-
fuses the Law and Cries for Alteration-State v. Glowacki, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657,
659-62, 693 (2002); Michelle Jaffe, Note, Up in Arms Over Florida's New "Stand Your
Ground" Law, 30 NOVA L. REv. 155, 156 (2005).
27 See, e.g., Green, supra note 23; Local Officials Applaud Castle Doctrine, TENNESSEAN,
June 15, 2007 ("[NRA lobbyist Chris] Cox said the legislation is a victim's rights measure
that puts the law on the side of victims 'who don't have the luxury of time when confronted by
a criminal."'); Roland Paolucci, Letter to the Editor, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later, AKRON
BEACON J., June 1, 2005, at B3 (arguing that Ohio should pass a castle doctrine statute and
declaring that "[i]t is time for Ohio to protect its residents and change the focus back to
victim's [sic] rights, instead of coddling criminals.").
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its elimination, and to challenge its cultural framing in current politically-
tinged legislative debates and ideological mappings.
The Note will proceed in four Parts. Part H1 describes the current state of
the castle doctrine. To contextualize, Part II will briefly trace the doctrine's
roots in the history of American duty to retreat jurisprudence and will then
examine the distinct types of criminal statutes that are often classified as
"castle laws." In doing so, Part II will attempt to draw distinctions between
those laws that are more prevalent and consistent with a broader pattern of
self-defense jurisprudence and those that are less common, more extreme,
and largely fall outside of the scope of this discussion.
Part III addresses the ideological underpinnings of and justifications for
the castle doctrine. It will discuss normative theories of moral philosophy
that underlie the castle doctrine and mark the poles of debate between sup-
porters and opponents of the doctrine. By situating the doctrine within the
ideological framework of other, less controversial self-defense laws, this
Note aims to reject the victims' rights sensibilities of castle doctrine
proponents.
Part IV confronts and questions the widely accepted cultural narrative
that has helped shape popular perception of the castle doctrine. It will reex-
amine the ideological packaging of the castle doctrine with the victims'
rights movement and other traditionally "socially conservative" stances.
Part IV will then return to John White and, using the language of cultural
theory and cultural history, suggest that the attempt to neatly categorize the
doctrine into a bipolar liberal/conservative framework wrongly disregards
alternative ideological mappings and risks a myopic failure to examine the
effects of having or not having a castle doctrine.
Finally, the Note will focus on the important consideration any dis-
course on the castle doctrine should give to societal effects. Using a legal
realist framework, the Note will argue that because the debate over the castle
doctrine does not adequately examine the doctrine's effects, the debate is
deficient. While this Note does not propose that social scientific studies of
the impact of the doctrine would be determinative, it will argue that an hon-
est, effective discussion about the castle doctrine is impossible without ex-
amining the potentially perverse results of abolishing the doctrine.
II. THE DUTY TO RETREAT AND THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE
CASTLE DOCTRINE
A. The Fall of the Duty to Retreat
2 8
An understanding of the historical roots of the castle doctrine requires
an understanding of a related self-defense doctrine: the duty to retreat. This
I For more detailed historical accounts of the duty to retreat, see generally BROWN, supra
note 25, at 3-38; JEANNIE SUK, AT HoME n' Tim LAW: How Tm DoMEsTic VIoLEN. c
2010]
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duty was part and parcel of the reluctance of English common law to legiti-
mize defensive killing and the right of self-defense.29 Until the thirteenth
century, the only justifications for homicide under English common law
were a writ of authorization from the King or the "authority of a custom by
which a thief.., an outlaw, or perhaps other manifest felons, might be taken
by force without a warrant."30 The only justifiable homicide, therefore, was
one committed under the auspices of the state, or at least in clear furtherance
of the state's interests. In addition to these justifiable killings, there was also
an excuse for homicide in self-defense available to a man3 whose life had
been threatened.32 To trigger this defense, however, the man who committed
the homicide must have first retreated until his back was to the wall. 3 Thus a
man had a duty to retreat before resorting to deadly force. Self-defense was
not viewed favorably by English jurists, and as a result, the duty to retreat
became solidified in the common law.
34
The duty to retreat can be seen as a statement of societal values that
held the preservation of human life and the prevention of violence para-
mount. Even though "[a] man may kill his enemy . . .for self-defence,"3
Blackstone was adamant that "it is an untrue position, when taken generally,
that by the law of nature or nations, a man may kill his enemy. '36 While this
description of the law as a codification of humanistic values certainly seems
to be significant to the development of the doctrine, it is importantly accom-
panied by a concern for the preservation of the supremacy of the state over
the individual. Just as in earlier eras, the state wanted to maintain a monop-
oly on the use of force.37 As Blackstone stated:
The law requires, that the person, who kills another in his own
defence, should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely
can, to avoid the violence of the assault, before he turns upon his
assailant; and that, not fictitiously, or in order to watch his oppor-
tunity, but from a real tenderness of shedding his brother's blood
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 58-65 (2009).
29 See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REv. 567
(1903).
31 Id. at 568; see also FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Tim His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 477 n. 1 (Cambridge: At The Univer-
sity Press, 2d ed. 1899) (1898) ("so late as 1328 it was argued that a plea of the dead man's
outlawry was a sufficient answer to an indictment for slaying him").
" This Part uses "man" instead of person, as that is the language of the laws and com-
mentary of these historical periods. Further, it is not clear whether these defenses were in fact
available to women, or whether there is any case law on the subject.
32 BROWN, supra note 25, at 4. Unlike a justifiable homicide, excusable homicide carried
with it an element of guilt. That said, the punitive weight attached to this guilt was slight, and
by the time of Blackstone's Commentaries, there was rarely any penalty levied for such homi-
cides. Id.33 Id.
34 Id. at 3.
35 WILIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 CoMMENTARIEs *423.
36 Id.
31 See BROWN, supra note 25, at 4; SUK, supra note 28, at 58.
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., yet between two fellow subjects the law countenances no such
point of honour: Because the king and his courts are the vindices
injuriarum, and will give to the party wronged all the satisfaction
he deserves. 8
By imposing this duty, therefore, the state was not only preventing conflict
among individuals, but was also discouraging a culture in which individuals
might trespass on the state's monopoly on violence.
Despite the significant precedent establishing the duty to retreat in the
English and Anglo-American common law, there was a dramatic movement
to abandon the duty in the United States during the late nineteenth century. 9
Scholars see this shift in many states' laws as resulting from a feeling that
the English common law tradition clashed with ideals held by "the Ameri-
can mind,"''4 and from a conception of honor central to frontier states, partic-
ularly in the West and South (the "true man" justification).4 1 The Indiana
Supreme Court offered the "American mind" justification in Runyan v.
State, a case about a fight between neighbors. 42 The Ohio Supreme Court
offered the "true man" justification in Erwin v. State, where the court con-
cluded that it would not enforce the "coward[ly]" (English) values of re-
treating in the face of conflict.43 After decades of occasionally conflicting
judicial opinions on the duty to retreat, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1921
effectively discarded the duty to retreat in Brown v. United States.44 Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes eschewed discussion of cultural values in favor
of an analysis of choices and concluded that "[d]etached reflection cannot
be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. '45 Thus, although states
31 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES * 184-85. The choice of the word "satisfac-
tion," with its implication of vengeance, may suggest that Blackstone is referring less to situa-
tions where a homicide was committed as an instinctive defensive act than to situations where
homicide was chosen. Indeed, the phrase vindices injuriam translates as either the "avengers"
or "punishers" of injury. The statement therefore suggests that the law and the state act not to
prevent injury (or act before it has occurred), but rather to punish or act afterwards.
39 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 25, at 5; SUK, supra note 28, at 59-60; Christine Cat-
alfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida's Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 504, 507-11 (2007).
40 See also BROWN, supra note 25, at 16-17 (citing Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 83 (1877)
("The tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against.., requiring a person
to flee when assailed.")).
41 See SUK, supra note 28, at 59-60; see, e.g., BROWN, supra note 25, at 17-20, 31, 39-47.
42 57 Ind. at 83. For a narrative account of the facts and procedural posture of the case, see
BROWN, supra note 25, at 10-17.
43 29 Ohio St. 186, 195, 199-200 (1876).
- 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
41 Id. at 343. In his discussion of cultural values and their impact on debates about legal
doctrine, Professor Dan Kahan suggests that Justice Holmes was motivated by a rationale
similar to that of the "true man" espoused in Erwin. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 429-35.
While it certainly may be that Justice Holmes's reliance on the language of deterrence masks a
strongly expressive or culturally motivated interpretation of the law's role in home invasion
cases, it is significant that an alternative to the "true man" justification was not only provided,
but was the alternative the Supreme Court embraced.
2010]
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have differing versions of it, the no duty to retreat doctrine enjoys a general
degree of legal and social acceptance.
For the purposes of this Note, it is particularly important to bear in
mind the widely accepted "monopoly on violence" rationale for the duty to
retreat espoused by Blackstone. 46 In addressing the moral and philosophical
underpinnings of the castle doctrine, Part III will return to the role of the
state, which has not been adequately recognized in the current moral and
philosophical debate.
B. The Rise of the Castle Doctrine
While English jurists held firmly to the duty to retreat as a seminal
concept, the common law did recognize an exception to the duty when a
man faced an attack in his own home.47 This exception combined two de-
fenses: self-defense and the "defense of habitation. '4s These two doctrines,
although distinct, were combined in rationale and effect in the formulation
of the castle doctrine. The common law rule that a man could kill an intruder
to prevent a violent felony-defense of habitation-is paralleled by the self-
defense rule that a man owes no duty to retreat in his own home from an
intruder intending to cause death or serious bodily harm. 49 Rooted in the
conviction that "a man's home is his castle," the common law rule allowing
deadly force against intruders became known as the castle doctrine.5 0 The
home is therefore distinguished from the public space, creating a dichotomy
between the public and private spheres and the law that applies in each.
According to Blackstone, the home was valued highly enough in the cultural
consciousness not only to be likened to a castle, a place where safety from
enemies should be guaranteed, but also to confer a certain degree of immu-
nity from the state.5 As Professor Jeannie Suk explains, "intrusion into the
6 See SUK, supra note 28, at 58-59. A century before Blackstone's Commentaries, Lord
Hale set forth an identical rationale for the duty to retreat. See MATTHEw HALE, HISTORY OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 481 (P. R. Glazebrook ed., Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (1678)
("[I]n cases of hostility between two nations it is a reproach and piece of cowardice to fly
from an enemy, yet in cases of assaults and affrays between subjects under the same law, the
law owns not any such point of honour, because the king and his laws are to be the vindices
injuriarum, and private persons are not trusted to take capital revenge one of another.").
" See Beale, supra note 29, at 574-75; see also Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep.
194, 195 (K.B.); Catalfamo, supra note 39, at 505.
41 See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-De-
fense, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 665 (2003).
'9 See State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 900 (Minn. 1999) (quoting State v. Touri, 112
N.W. 422, 424 (Minn. 1907)); SUK, supra note 28, at 58-59; Carpenter, supra note 48.
0 For a more detailed discussion of the derivation of the doctrine's name, see Carpenter,
supra note 48, at 656 n.10.
51 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *223; SUK, supra note 28, at 58 (in the home, the
tender regard for peace of which Blackstone spoke was overridden by "tender ... regard to the
immunity of a man's house").
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home thus placed the intruder beyond the protection of the law and sus-
pended the state monopoly on violence."
2
The evolving American jurisprudence retained the castle doctrine in its
adoption of the English common law.53 Yet, in the late nineteenth century,
with the emergence of the "true man" doctrine and the elimination of a duty
to retreat in many states, the exceptionality of the home as a place where the
state did not have a monopoly on violence began to wane. In a sense, with
this expansion of the new right to violence afforded to individuals, the castle
doctrine became the paradigmatic case for understanding how the "true
man" ought to be expected to behave.
At the same time, however, in many states that did not eliminate the
duty to retreat, courts retained the castle doctrine as the primary exception to
the duty to retreat.5 4 In these traditional duty to retreat states, the castle doc-
trine was justified as a historical necessity-another artifact of the English
common law retained by American courts.55 This historical framing gave a
settled quality to the doctrine, setting it apart from the general question of
the duty to retreat, which remained a contested issue between states.
Bishop's treatise on criminal law identifies the castle doctrine as an ancient
52 See SUK, supra note 28, at 59.
3 See, e.g., People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914). Judge Cardozo asserted:
It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is
bound to retreat. If assailed here he may stand his ground and resist the attack. He is
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own
home.... Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the
home. That there is, in such situation, no duty to retreat is, we think, the settled law
in the United States as in England.
Id 54 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884) ("It is an admitted doctrine of our criminal
jurisprudence, that when a person is attacked in his own house, he is not required to retreat
further .... The law regards a man's house as his castle, or, as was anciently said, his tutis-
simum refugium, and having retired thus far, he is not compelled to yield further to his as-
sailing antagonist."); Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 337 (1882) ("Of course, where one is
attacked in his own dwelling-house, he is never required to retreat. His 'house is his castle,'
and the law permits him to protect its sanctity from every unlawful invasion." (internal cita-
tions omitted)); People v. Zuckerman 132 P.2d 545, 549-50 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942) ("Cali-
fornia courts have definitely rejected the antiquated doctrine that a defendant will be justified
in killing his assailant in self-defense only after he has used every possible means of escape by
fleeing, [including] 'retreating to the wall.'"); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 447-48
(Iowa 1883) ("This instruction, as applied to the facts of this case, in so far as it makes it
incumbent upon the defendant to retreat, is, we think, erroneous. The defendant at the time of
the difficulty was in his own house."); Pond v. The People, 8 Mich. 150, 177 (1860) ("A man
is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means as are
absolutely necessary to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, even
to the taking of life.").
" The nineteenth-century cases identifying the castle doctrine as a fixture of the common
law frequently relied on citations to scholarly literature and treatises as opposed to cases,
perhaps as a means of attempting to invoke the philosophical justifications that these earlier
works had provided for the often contentious realm of self-defense and also to make the excep-
tional doctrine seem settled and canonical. See, e.g., Middleham, 17 N.W. at 448 ("In Horrigan
and Thompson's Cases on Self Defense, page 33, it is said: 'A man, being in his habitation, is
at the wall and in his castle, and is not obliged to retreat under any circumstances."').
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doctrine that had evolved to meet historical and social necessity. 6 In his
section on "Defence of the Castle," Bishop explains:
In the early times, our forefathers were compelled to protect them-
selves in their habitation by converting them into holds of defence;
and so the dwelling-house was called a castle. To this condition of
things the law has conformed, resulting in the familiar doctrine
that while a man keeps the door of his house closed, no other may
break and enter it . . . .From this doctrine is derived another;
namely, that the persons within the house may exercise all needful
force to keep aggressors out, even to the taking of life.
57
Thus in the nineteenth century, the castle doctrine actually appears to have
been a significantly less contentious legal concept than laws concerning the
general duty to retreat in public places.
C. The Contemporary Castle Doctrine
After the period of activity in many of the nation's courts surrounding
the removal of the duty to retreat from self-defense, the twentieth century
saw little change to the castle doctrine.58 In the past few decades, however,
the castle doctrine has experienced a renaissance of sorts. With the strong
support of the National Rifle Association ("NRA"), state legislatures have
begun to reexamine state criminal codes, amending past statutes to shore up
old castle doctrine provisions5 9 and passing new laws to expand the castle
doctrine or to merge it with the "true man" laws that previously effectively
dissolved any duty to retreat. 6° A 2005 Florida castle doctrine statute kicked
56 See JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW
SYSTEM OF LEGAL ExPosrrlON 517 (T.H. Flood and Company, Law Publishers ed., 8th ed.
1892).57 
Id.
" What the latter part of the twentieth century did contribute to the realm of self-defense
law was a series of doctrinal and philosophical changes relating to domestic violence. With the
rise of feminism in legal scholarship and jurisprudence, gender dynamics and gender roles
took on a great deal of importance in debates over when a person is permitted to resort to
violence for self-preservation. There has been significant scholarship on domestic violence, the
concept of the "battered woman" or "battered person," and the use of the so-called Battered
Woman Syndrome in formulating a defense. See generally SUK, supra note 28; Carpenter,
supra note 48. Some of these concepts will recur later in the discussion of the possible per-
verse consequences of the castle doctrine.
'9 See, e.g., Act of May 6, 2006, ch. 194, § 4, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1362, 1363 (codified
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3212 (2008)) (general statement of castle doctrine originally drafted
in 1969, but amended in 2007 to expand the language and include: "(c) Nothing in this section
shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person's dwell-
ing"). See generally People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 346-49 (Colo. 2000) (discussing differences
in duty to retreat laws from state to state).
'See, e.g., Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 27, § 1, sec. 776.013(1), 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 200
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2010)). The Florida act includes relatively expansive
castle doctrine language, which provides a very strong presumption in favor of the homeowner
that an intruder poses an imminent threat of intended violence. To that effect, it reads: "A
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off a rush of legislative activity, along with a flood of skeptical literature. 61
By January 2007, at least fifteen states had passed bills that were (or pur-
ported to be) statements of the castle doctrine.
62
As a result, the nature, prevalence, and definition of the castle doctrine
are currently in a significant state of flux. Professor Catherine Carpenter
states, "[R]ather than providing a settled exception to the generalized duty
to retreat, the Castle Doctrine has evolved into a confusing patchwork of
rules on when, and against whom, one may assume the privilege of non-
retreat. '63 Self-defense in the home has become a popular topic and is fre-
quently the subject of new legislation; however, the nomenclature has be-
come somewhat misleading, thereby exacerbating the already confusing
discrepancies between the intricacies of differing state criminal codes. 64 Per-
haps simply because of a desire to create a coherent narrative for their sup-
porters, or perhaps because it is a memorable or catchy title for legislation,
person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwelling, residence,
or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act
involving force or violence." Id. § 1, sec. 776.013(4), 2005 Fla. Laws at 201 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 776.013(4)). In addition, this law merges with the earlier "true man" laws eliminating
a duty to retreat in public places by including:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other
place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to
stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she
reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to
himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
Id. § 1, sec. 776.013(3), 2005 Fla. Laws at 201 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3)).
61 See SUK, supra note 28, at 73-80; Sam Cook, 'Stand Your Ground' a Recipe for Disas-
ter, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers, Fla.), Oct. 5, 2005, at B1 ("Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' law
... is an accident waiting to happen."); Michelle Cottle, Shoot First, Regret Legislation Later,
TIME, May 9, 2005, at 80; Debi Drewes, Letter to the Editor, Fear Breeds Fear; Guns Breed
Death, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 17, 2005, at 2 ("[Wlhere is the sense or intelli-
gence in the right to shoot another being based on brief and fleeting impressions of threat or
fear for safety?"); Arthur C. Hayhoe, Op-Ed., NRA's Magic Words, TAMPA TRIB. (Fla.), May
20, 2005, at 13 ("We have several million untrained gun owners in Florida. If you embolden
gun owners to act more aggressively, as this new bill certainly does, there will be many inno-
cent victims."); NPR Day to Day: Stand Your Ground, Gun in Hand (NPR radio broadcast
Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4934076
("[I]f you live in Florida, or plan on traveling there, a few key things to keep in mind so you
don't get, you know, shot. First, don't look at anyone funny. In fact, avoid making eye contact
with people.").
Interestingly, however, despite the intense critical response that the Florida statute elicited,
the statute appears in many ways to be simply a codification of the state's strong common law
commitment to the castle doctrine. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049-50 (Fla. 1999)
(stating that "[i]t is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own
dwelling is bound to retreat," before citing a long strand of Florida cases supporting the com-
mon law castle exception to the duty to retreat (citing People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497
(N.Y. 1914))); see also Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965); Pell v. State, 122 So.
110, 116 (Fla. 1929); Danford v. State, 43 So. 593, 598-99 (Fla. 1907); Wilson v. State, 11 So.
556, 561 (Fla. 1892).
6 2 
CHRISTOPHER RE1NHART, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, CASTLE DOCTRINE AND SELF-DE-
FENSE 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-R-0052.htm.
61 Carpenter, supra note 48, at 657.
64 For a discussion of the distinctions between different states' statutory schemes, see infra
notes 67-76.
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the NRA, as well as critics of the doctrine, have continued to refer to a wide
swath of no duty to retreat bills as "castle laws" or "castle doctrine" laws.
65
This has resulted in a merging of the debates over two fundamentally differ-
ent sets of laws.
Some castle laws, like the Maine statute,66 effectively restate the En-
glish common law castle doctrine. For example, Alaska's self-defense stat-
ute, which was revised as recently as 2006, establishes that:
A person may not use deadly force under this section if the person
knows that, with complete personal safety and with complete
safety as to others being defended, the person can avoid the neces-
sity of using deadly force by leaving the area of the encounter,
except there is no duty to leave the area if the person is
(1) on premises
(A) that the person owns or leases;
(B) where the person resides, temporarily or perma-
nently; or
(C) as a guest or express or implied agent of the owner,
lessor, or resident .... 67
Similarly, in enacting castle doctrine legislation in 1994, the North Carolina
legislature explicitly announced its adherence to the doctrine's historical
roots by including specific language to establish that the castle law was "not
intended to repeal, expand, or limit any other defense that may exist under
the common law. '
68
These statutes frequently provide something beyond a codification of
common law principles by altering the presumption of reasonableness in a
home invasion to favor the home dweller.69 In other words, instead of the
home dweller needing to prove that his or her decision to resort to deadly
force was reasonable, the state would have the burden at trial of proving that
the decision was unreasonable. Under California's statutory scheme, for
instance:
Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have
held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily
injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that
65 See NRA Inst. for Legislative Action, Fortifying the Right to Self-Defense, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.nraila.org/IssuesfFactSheetsRead.aspx?id=188 [hereinafter Fortifying the Right
to Self-Defense]; NRA Inst. for Legislative Action, This Train Keeps a Rollin ', July 28, 2006,
http://www.nraila.net/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?ID = 199; cf Carpenter, supra note 48, at 657
(specifying that the "castle doctrine" refers only to a certain situation in which duty to retreat
is removed).
'6See ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 104(3)(B)(1) (West 2009).
67 Act of June 15, 2006, ch. 68, § 3, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 3-4 (codified at ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.335(b) (2008)).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.1 (2009).
' See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 198.5 (Deering 2008).
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force is used against another person, not a member of the family or
household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully
and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force
knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry
occurred.7 0
However, although these laws vary in their requirements of reasonableness7
and in their definitions of what behavior (e.g., trespass, burglary, etc.) trig-
gers the right to use deadly force, they share as a central tenet an emphasis
on the home as the sole space where the duty to retreat is abrogated.
The second group of laws, which has also come under the banner of
"the castle doctrine," includes those that abolish the duty to retreat more
broadly. 72 Florida's controversial statute, for example, establishes that an in-
dividual behaving lawfully in a place that he or she has a right to be "has no
duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force
with force, including deadly force. '73 These laws, which are also (and more
accurately) dubbed "stand your ground" laws, generally represent a restate-
ment of the expansive "true man" doctrine rather than the narrower common
law castle doctrine. In other words, while many of these statutes share the
same concern for safety in the home as the narrower castle doctrine statutes,
they also represent a much broader rejection of the English common law's
duty to retreat.
Whereas the Alaska justified homicide statute and many of the previ-
ously discussed state statutes attempt to craft narrowly tailored rules (e.g.,
specifying whether the castle doctrine applies to renters as well as owners),
74
the "stand your ground" laws tend to be much broader. For example, as
amended in 2006, Kentucky's "stand your ground" law simply states, "[a]
70 Id.
"1 Compare id. (shifting the burden to the prosecution), and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-8
(2002) ("In the event that any person shall die or shall sustain a personal injury in any way or
for any cause while in the commission of any criminal offense enumerated in §§ 11-8-2 - 11-
8-6, it shall be rebuttably presumed as a matter of law in any civil or criminal proceeding that
the owner, tenant, or occupier of the place where the offense was committed acted by reasona-
ble means in self-defense and in the reasonable belief that the person engaged in the criminal
offense was about to inflict great bodily harm or death upon that person or any other individual
lawfully in the place where the criminal offense was committed."), with CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-20 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008) ("A person in possession or control of premises, or
a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using
reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably be-
lieves such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission
of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly
physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in sec-
tion 53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by
the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his
dwelling as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such
prevention or termination.").
72 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
13 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
" ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b)(1) (2008).
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person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or
she has a right to be."" Similarly, in Arizona after 2006, when faced with a
plausible threat of any of a range of violent crimes, "[t]here is no duty to
retreat before threatening or using physical force or deadly physical force.
76
While in these states the home still remains the "paradigmatic place" where
no duty to retreat exists (as evidenced by the continued use of the "castle
doctrine" or "castle law" moniker for the legislation and the statutes' con-
struction), 77 the narrow exception has swallowed the rule in the "stand your
ground" statutes, making them much more the progeny of Runyan or Erwin,
than of Blackstone. As a result, the group of laws that has as an underlying
assumption the exceptionality of the home, rather than the broader "stand
your ground laws," are the ones that truly represent the castle doctrine.
Thus, when this Note refers to the castle doctrine, it is invoking the former.
III. MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
CASTLE DOCTRINE
In the current debate, castle doctrine proponents such as the NRA gen-
erally justify their position by invoking the strictly retributive view that, by
virtue of breaking the law, the intruder forfeits his or her rights and deserves
the consequences that result from his or her action.78 This Part will suggest
that the grounding of the castle doctrine in the retributive theory has led to
the doctrine's association with the victims' rights movement and has created
a philosophical and ideological backlash that has prevented a realistic evalu-
ation of the doctrine. This Part will further suggest that the doctrine should
actually be viewed as grounded in non-retributive self-defense law and thus
recognized as historically, normatively, and ideologically distinct from the
controversial tenets of the victims' rights movement, which is often focused
on vengeance.
79
The strictly Kantian retributive view that breaking the law leads to the
forfeiture of an individual's rights tends to dominate the rhetoric of castle
doctrine supporters.80 The central concept of the forfeiture theory is that,
although all persons have certain inalienable rights, an individual who
breaks the law (i.e., invades a house) forfeits these rights to the person
whose rights have been infringed upon (i.e., the home dweller)." As a result,
Act of Apr. 21, 2006, ch. 192, § 4, 2006 Ky. Acts 707, 708 (codified at Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 503.080(3) (West 2009)).
76 Act of Apr. 24, 2006, ch. 199, § 3, 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws 626, 627 (codified at ARoz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411(B) (2009)).
77 See SUK, supra note 28, at 61.
78 See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 855-59 (Little Brown ed. 1978).
71 See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
0 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 60-75; Fortifying the Right to Self-Defense,
supra note 65.
"I See Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 MONIST 550, 568 (1968) (quoting W. DAVID
Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 60-61 (1930)).
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the intruder has effectively willed his or her punishment.82 Within academia,
Professor George Fletcher has been a vocal proponent of this forfeiture the-
ory as an important justification for defensive killings. 3 In the political
arena, the NRA has stressed the importance of protecting the rights of "law-
abiding citizens" instead of "criminals." 4 The NRA's lobbying effort to en-
act a castle statute in West Virginia, for example, revolved around the rhetor-
ical framing of the law as a means of "allowing law-abiding citizens to stand
their ground to protect themselves and their family.""a
By eliminating any rights of the intruder and by focusing on the rights
of the home dweller or victim, the retributive justification also creates a
strong alliance between the castle doctrine and the victims' fights move-
mentS6-a movement that supports capital punishment, sentencing enhance-
ment, and similar measures that emphasize rights of victims over the rights
of defendants as an important aspect of criminal justice."7 Practically and
82 See id. Stuart Green provides a useful outline of the various philosophical justifications
for defensive killings. See Green, supra note 23, at 19-25. For his discussion of "moral forfei-
ture," see id. at 20.
" See George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in
Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 367, 380 (1973).
" See, e.g., Fortifying the Right to Self-Defense, supra note 65 ("Without doubt, Florida's
recently enacted 'Castle Doctrine' law is good law, casting a common-sense light onto the
debate over the right of self-defense. It reverses the pendulum that for too long has swung in
the direction of protecting the rights of criminals over the rights of their victims.").
Some scholars have leveled strong criticism at the forfeiture theory. See, e.g., SUZANNE
UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE 191 (1994)
("A theory which maintains that an unjust aggressor forfeits the ight to life cannot [ground]
the justification of homicide in self-defence [sic]."); Bedau, supra note 81; Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973). There is a systemic critique of the
forfeiture theory, for instance, that relies on an objection to the concept of a social contract
between citizens of the state. See, e.g., Murphy, supra; Tom Dannenbaum, Note, Crime Be-
yond Punishment, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 189, 201-202 (2009); Bailey Kuklin,
Article, "You Should Have Known Better," 48 KAN. L. REV. 545, 578 n.109 (2000).
In the context of racially disproportionate enforcement and prosecution, this line of argu-
ment has been focused on the relationship between blacks and the American social contract.
Professor Paul Butler, in suggesting that black jurors should practice nullification to prevent
over-incarceration of black defendants, writes that the form of "democracy" represented by
the American social contract "has betrayed African Americans far more than they could ever
betray it." Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 693 (1995). For a broader discussion of the critique of the social
contractual approach to criminal culpability, see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND
THE LAW, 295-310 (1997).
5 Press Release, NRA Inst. for Legislative Action, West Virginia Governor Signs 'Castle
Doctrine' Legislation! (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/
Read.aspx?id= 3672.
86 See Marion P. Hammer, Letter to the Editor, Anti-Gun Groups Mislead on Self-Defense
Laws, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne, Fla.), Oct. 15, 2005, at Al0 (praising a recently passed Florida
statute codifying castle doctrine, saying that it puts "Florida law ... on the side of law-abiding
victims rather than criminals. And that is the way it is supposed to be"); Fortifying the Right to
Self-Defense, supra note 65 (arguing that the Florida castle law "gives rights back to law-
abiding people and forces judges and prosecutors to focus on protecting victims"); see also
supra note 27.
I" See generally Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing,
Remedy, and Review, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 255, 265-73 (2005); Vik Kanwar, Capital Punish-
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philosophically, however, there is a fundamental difference between the vic-
tims' rights movement and the castle doctrine. Central to the victims' rights
movement is the focus on granting more power to victims via the state. Most
proposed victims' rights statutes focus on after-the-fact procedural tools to
assist the victim by enhancing state power, particularly prosecutorial
power.8 Whereas the victims' rights movement represents a willingness to
increase state power, propounding a compensatory, punitive system, 9 the
castle doctrine actually rejects state-based punishment or expansive state-
sponsored vengeance and instead recognizes the right of an individual to act
to preserve him or herself. Indeed, historically the castle doctrine was excep-
tional because it recognized the rare instance in which the state does not
preserve its monopoly on violence.90 The castle doctrine addresses a situa-
tion where there is an immediate concern, not for punishment, but rather for
the preservation of self, in a context where the state has absolutely no ability
to act in a preventative capacity.
The misplaced coupling of the castle doctrine and the victims' rights
movement that has arisen by grounding the doctrine in retributivism and
forfeiture should be reexamined. The autonomy and right to self-preserva-
tion of the home dweller make for an alternative, more compelling founda-
tion. Granted, it is possible to read Rhode Island's castle doctrine statute,
which provides that "[t]here shall be no duty on the part of an owner, ten-
ant, or occupier to retreat from any person engaged in the commission of any
[specified] criminal offense," 91 as suggesting that a person acting criminally
has forfeited some rights. There is an existing body of scholarship, however,
that asserts an alternative justification: that impeding the right of self-de-
fense when one party is innocent would also be an unjustifiable challenge to
ment as "Closure": The Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 215, 222-37 (2002); Paul H. Robinson, Should the Victims' Rights Movement Have
Influence Over Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 749,
755-57 (2002); Shannon Brownlee et al., The Place for Vengeance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 16, 1997, at 24; Alan Turner, Making Life Miserable for Felons, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 11, 2000, at A35.
88 See Beloof, supra note 87, at 262-74; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.010 (1984);
Stephen E. Branchflower, The Alaska Office of Victims' Rights: A Model for America, 21
ALASKA L. REV. 259 (2004).
In empowering the victim, victims' rights efforts also empower the state. While the rights
conferred by victims' rights legislation are ostensibly rights granted to the victim against the
defendant, they require state action to enforce and are therefore rights granted to the state
against the defendant in the Hohfeldian or legal realist sense. The right to restitution, for exam-
ple, necessarily empowers the state to compel restitution.
89 See Bruce Shapiro, Victims & Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment Is a Bad
Idea, NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11, 12-16 (arguing that a focus on vengeance has become the
politically dominant strand in the victims' rights movement); cf Marshall N. Perkins, Beyond
the Roar of the Crowd: Victim Impact Testimony Collides with Due Process, 27 U. BALT. L.F.
31, 36 (1997) (arguing that victim impact statements are "more appropriately analyzed in
terms of personal revenge rather than retribution").
o See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
91 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-8-8 (2002).
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the individual's autonomy. 92 To deny the right to resort to force would com-
pel the individual to cede his or her autonomy to some other party, whether
to the intruder at the time of the invasion or to the state after the fact.93
Requiring some sort of threat or imminence calculus during a home inva-
sion, particularly in emotionally charged situations where delay may not be
an option, may effectively force a home occupant to value the well-being of
the intruder more highly than his or her own safety. 94 This would violate
traditional principles of self-defense, particularly those espoused by the
Model Penal Code.
95
In fact, in its sections on the use of force in self-defense, the Model
Penal Code focuses almost exclusively on the defender's preservation of self
as opposed to the aggressor's culpability. 96 A person is generally allowed to
resort to force not when another person is behaving unlawfully, but when
another person poses an imminent threat.97 The statutory focus on the reason-
ableness of the home dweller's belief that the intruder poses a threat-
whether proof of reasonableness is required, as in Connecticut,9 or assumed,
as in California 99-also speaks to the focus on the home dweller rather than
the intruder. In other words, the statutes are concerned with the mens rea and
the reactivity of the home dwellers, not of the home invaders. Thus, the
castle doctrine is, in fact, logically situated in the broader context of neces-
92 See FLETCHER, supra note 78, at 860-75; Green, supra note 23, at 24; see, e.g., John Q.
La Fond, The Case for Liberalizing the Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 6 U. PUcET
SOUND L. REV. 237, 243-44, 279 (1983).
93 See, e.g., La Fond, supra note 92, at 243-44.
14 It is essential to stress that the debate regarding whose rights to favor in the context of
the castle doctrine is not the same as a debate over the recognition of property rights (as to who
has a Hohfeldian ight/no right to enter property); rather, this is an issue of a right to self-
preservation. This is yet another reason why it seems so important to differentiate among the
statutes referred to as castle laws. There is an uneasy tension between property law and crimi-
nal law in the discussion of the castle doctrine that can create the impression that, as a legal
concept, the castle doctrine is geared towards preservation of property ownership rather than
life. While some castle doctrine-type statutes may emphasize property rights, those that truly
operate within the framework of the castle doctrine as a common law principle are explicit in
permitting defense of self as opposed to property. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fun-
damental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
For an example of a property-centered statute, see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.080 (Lexis-
Nexis 2008 & Supp. 2009). For an example of a statute that focuses on preservation of life as
opposed to protection of property, see HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 703-304 (LexisNexis 2007 &
Supp. 2009).
91 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985) (choice of evils); id. § 3.04(l)(c) ("[T]he use
of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force
by such other person on the present occasion.").
96 See, e.g., id. § 3.04.
" See, e.g., id.; see also id. §§ 3.04(1), 3.05(1). It is true that the Model Penal Code
specifies that the force that triggers the right to self-defense must be "unlawful," but this is in
no way the same as allowing the use of force in response to any unlawful behavior. Indeed, the
Model Penal Code prescribes special requirements of "necessity" and "imminence" to sug-
gest that this is a general right that should be recognized narrowly.
91 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-20 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009).
9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 198.5 (Deering 2008).
2010]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
sity defenses as an affirmation of a fundamental societal concern for the
preservation of life, as opposed to being grounded in a retributive philoso-
phy that criminals should be dealt with violently.
In addition to the Model Penal Code's recognition of self-defense as a
right independent of a belief in forfeiture, a broader literature of political
philosophy suggests that the castle doctrine need not be rooted in retributive
arguments. Rights-based theories legitimizing state authority concede that
the individual maintains a moral right to protect him or herself against ag-
gression by means of deadly force. 1"0 According to such theories, citizens of
the state submit to the state's monopoly on the use of force in exchange for
stability and the state's protection. 10 1 When it is impossible for the state to
protect its citizens, however, it is both fair and logical that individuals
should be able to resort to violence when necessary for self-defense. Al-
though this right to resort to violence is generally viewed by proponents of
the forfeiture theory as a right against the intruder, 1' 2 such a reading is
flawed by its failure to recognize the state's monopoly on violence and the
reasoning that supports this monopoly. 103 The right against the intruder is
more correctly viewed as a right that the home dweller has against the state
for protection against violence and exercises on behalf of the state in the
state's absence. 104
In a situation where two (possibly) armed individuals meet in an en-
closed space, any discussion of preservation of life is heavily influenced by a
hindsight bias. Should a panicked home occupant really be expected or mor-
ally required to conduct a calculus of the imminence of physical damage?
The most terrifying characteristic of a home invasion is that it presents a
situation where preventative state involvement is usually impracticable.
Moreover, the almost involuntary reactive fear referred to by Holmes in
Brown makes defensive killing practically impossible to deter, even when it
turns out that the invader posed no real threat. 05
"o See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal
Law, 64 CAL. L. REV. 871, 885 (1976) (identifying this right against the state based on the
natural rights language of Locke, Hobbes, and Rawls); see also UNIACKE, supra note 84, at
156-60 (describing an analogous "unlawful aggression" definition to the one espoused by
Dean Sanford Kadish); Green, supra note 23, at 22 (identifying Kadish as one of the primary
proponents of this theory of "the right to resist unlawful aggression").
10 See Kadish, supra note 100, at 885 ("[T]he individual's surrender of prerogative to the
state yields a quid pro quo of greater, not lesser, protection against aggression than he had
before.").
102 See Fletcher, supra note 83, at 380 ("[Aiggression breaches an implicit contract
among autonomous agents, according to which each person ... is bound to respect the living
space of all others. The intrusion upon someone's living space itself triggers a justified re-
sponse."); see also Green, supra note 23, at 24.
03 See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text.
104 See Green, supra note 23, at 22; see, e.g., Kadish, supra note 100, at 895.
o See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921); see also supra notes 44, 45 and
accompanying text. Professor Fletcher poses a hypothetical in which a "psychotic aggressor,"
who intends no harm but who in fact poses a great threat, attacks another individual. Fletcher
concludes that at the moment the of the attack the culpability of the aggressor is inconsequen-
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IV. RESITUATING THE CASTLE DocTINE's CULTURAL FRAMING
The current discourse on the legitimacy, desirability, and importance of
the castle doctrine in American society has mostly focused on the law's ideo-
logical and cultural underpinnings. °6 As a culturally-laden and contentious
issue, the castle doctrine has taken on great expressive and symbolic signifi-
cance. While the expressive role of castle doctrine is important, this cultural
and expressive framing should be reexamined in conjunction with a focus on
both the philosophical justifications and the effects of the doctrine.
Despite its limited and infrequent application, the castle doctrine has
recently attracted extensive media coverage and has elicited fierce opposi-
tion. Perhaps, as others have suggested, duty to retreat laws and the castle
doctrine are outgrowths of a particular way of thinking, a general cultural
consciousness as opposed to a particular philosophy of punishment.0 7 Per-
haps, like the rejection of the English common law concept of duty to re-
treat, castle laws are indicative of a rugged, quintessentially American
individualism that can be seen in the cultural historical narrative beginning
with westward expansion, moving from the films of John Ford and John
Wayne to Vietnam, and more recently to what has been called the "cowboy
democracy" of the Bush administration. °8 Whether the emphasis is placed
on legal doctrine or on some broader cultural mythos, tracing this trope of
the "true man" through American history is not uncommon.? 9 The narrative
of an American West that values individualism and self-reliance may in cer-
tial. Fletcher, supra note 83, at 371. Now imagine a rule requiring the home dweller to assess
the aggressor's moral culpability. While one might conceive of a motivation for such a rule
other than to value the rights of the aggressor more highly than the rights of the home dweller,
such a rule might well reflect this prioritization in its application.
"o See, e.g., Cottle, supra note 61, at 80 ("It's as if the text of a real bill somehow got
transposed with dialogue from a 1970s Dirty Harry paean to vigilantism."); Thornburgh, supra
note 18 (discussing the way the castle doctrine relates to Texas's "gun-nut reputation").
107 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 25, at 6 ("In the realms of both peace and war, it is not in
the nature of America to approve retreat"); id. at 158 ("It is obvious that the legal and individ-
ual doctrine of no duty to retreat is highly cognate with the broad social theme of conquest."
(emphasis added)).
8 See, e.g., id. at 166 ("A Texan with a family background deeply rooted in the embat-
tled nineteenth-century pioneer era of Texas, [President Lyndon B.] Johnson thought naturally
in terms of concepts strongly held in Texas: no duty to retreat, standing one's ground, and I'll
die before I'll run." (footnote omitted)); SUK, supra note 28, at 84-85 (analogizing the attacks
of September 11, 2001 to the invasion of the home, and drawing a parallel between the rise in
popularity of the castle doctrine and the War on Terror rhetoric of defending the home front).
" See generally RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF THE FRON-
TIER IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1800-1890 (1985) [hereinafter THE FATAL ENVIRON-
MENT] (deconstructing the myth of the frontier and outlining how frontier culture affected
development of mass culture and politics); RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE
MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992) (tracking these themes' de-
velopment into the twentieth century); WIL WRIGHT, Six GUNS AND SOCamTY: A STRUCTURAL
STUDY OF THE WESTERN (1975) (exploring the Western film genre, as well as the political and
social implications of the Western as a cultural construction); BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE
(United Artists 2002) (discussing links between imperialism, racism, gun violence, and the
frontier in United States history and culture).
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tain situations be useful in providing insights into the development of legal
doctrines. But an attempt to suggest a direct correlation between the castle
doctrine and the image of the action-oriented, stereotypically masculine
American codes the doctrine as clearly or inherently "conservative." Such
an attempt errs in its oversimplification of competing ideologies, as well as
in its focus on the expressive function of the law at the expense of consider-
ing the effects of the law.
Because the United States's political system is effectively bipartite,
Americans tend to map their political and legal positions on a fairly unam-
biguous bipolar axis. Thus, various laws are readily labeled as right or left,
conservative or progressive, or some other similar formulation. Current
thinking has firmly placed the castle doctrine among conservative legisla-
tion, even situating it alongside capital punishment."0
Thus, and not surprisingly, legal, political, and social discourse relating
to the castle doctrine seems preoccupied with presenting the doctrine as be-
longing to a package of beliefs and views that are firmly situated in the
ideological right."' Kahan, like other commentators,"2 has analyzed the duty
110 See, e.g., Roger Croteau, Leadership Raised as Issue in Race for Hill Country Seat,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 25, 2008, at BI (describing a congressman's "strong, con-
servative representation" of his district as epitomized by his co-authoring a castle doctrine law
and supporting mandatory minimum prison terms for child sex offenders); Michael Brendan
Dougherty, Plain Right, Am. CONSERVATIVE, Mar. 9, 2009, at 6, 8 ("Sanford's conservative
credentials compare favorably to anyone else mentioned as a 2012 presidential contender. He
calls the public-education system 'a Soviet-style monopoly.' He promoted school choice
through tax rebates to avoid the appearance of government control. He passed a 'Castle doc-
trine' bill that was supported by the NRA. He favors a law-and-order approach to immigration,
but opposed REAL ID on civil liberties grounds. Though he avoids showy displays of piety, he
is reliably pro-life."); Chris Joyner, State's Castle Doctrine Puts Power in Hands of Victims,
Advocates Say, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 5, 2007, at Al ("Mississippi's castle
doctrine law was met with wide popular acclaim in this conservative, gun-friendly state");
Rebecca Le6n, Senate Panel Kills 'Castle Doctrine' Bill, ALTAVISTA J., Mar. 8, 2010, http://
www.wpcva.com/articles/2010/03/08/chatham/news/news37.txt ("[the Virginia castle doctrine
bill] was struck down by the Senate Courts of Justice Committee on a 9-6 party-line vote
Wednesday. All of the Democrats on the panel voted to kill the bill; all of the Republicans
wanted to keep it alive."); Kelsey Palmer, Op-Ed., Chuck Hopson is a Conservative, JACKSON-
VILLE PROGRESS, Feb. 27, 2010, http://jacksonvilleprogress.com/opinion/x 1834678612/Chuck-
Hopson-is-a-conservative ("The idea that Chuck is not conservative is ridiculous! From
coauthoring the Castle Doctrine to sponsoring small business tax exemptions, Chuck has been
for limited government involvement in our business and personal lives."); Mannix Porterfield,
Senator Confident About 'Castle Doctrine' Bill, FAYETTE T"IB., Oct. 4, 2007, http://
www.fayettetribune.com/local/x211932306/Senator-confident-about-castle-doctrine-
bill?%20target= (" 'You have some very liberal individuals who don't want that bill at all'")
(quoting a state representative); Anthony J. Sebok, Florida's New "Stand Your Ground" Law:
Why It's More Extreme Than Other States' Self-Defense Measures, and How It Got That Way,
F NDLAW, May 2, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html ("[The Florida
statute's] real purpose seems to be the capital punishment of property-criminals."); cf Kahan,
supra note 26, at 435-36.
"11 See, e.g., Leah Rupp, Candidates in District 29 Race Discuss Education, Experience,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 14, 2007, at B 1 (" 'He voted for right-to-life, the Cas-
tle Doctrine, balanced budgets,' the interim Byram mayor said. 'Just about any issue you can
think of, he's voted for the conservative side of it."'); Kelley Shannon, Bill Strengthens Texans'
Right to Use Deadly Force, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.chron.com/disp/
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to retreat against a backdrop of clear dichotomous distinctions between left
and right. Kahan identifies as individualist a set of values, principles, and
policies that are key elements of Republican political views, while he identi-
fies competing stances widely aligned with liberal Democrats as evidence of
an antithetical communitarian philosophy concerned with a greater social
good.
113
But the impulse to classify stances into two ideological camps is often
problematic because it risks missing crucial elements of legal and sociopolit-
ical debates. Such is the case with debates concerning the castle doctrine.
Situating the castle doctrine in a neat left or right category risks self-defini-
tion. As opposed to being the polar opposites of each other, the two alterna-
tive views can often become each other's supplements in the Derridean
sense, such that the "liberal" position becomes diacritical with the "con-
servative" one. Each ideological position can become defined solely by the
existence of the other, rather than by ideology or experience."
14
What can be characterized as the standard left/right ideological map-
ping, as exemplified by Kahan's work,"5 is outlined below:
Liberal Conservative
Democrat Republican
Values the group/community Values the individual
Believes that all have rights that Believes that some forfeit their
the state must protect-that the rights through unlawful
law is there to protect all behavior-that the law is there to
protect those who obey it
Opposes the death penalty Supports the death penalty
Opposes the castle doctrine Supports the castle doctrine
story.mpl/metropolitan/4647268.html ("The bill, pushed by Republican lawmakers and backed
by the National Rifle Association, states that a person has no duty to retreat from an intruder in
his or her home."); cf. Kahan, supra note 26, at 441, 489.
While identifying left or right on a political spectrum is far from the purpose of Kahan's
piece, the logic of the article, much like the discourse on the castle doctrine or no duty to
retreat statutes, seems preoccupied with presenting dichotomous relationships predicated upon
(occasionally inconsistent) packages of beliefs and views. In creating his groupings, which are
generally descriptive and based on social scientific data, Kahan concedes that "no necessary
[philosophical] link" exists between, say, a view on abortion and the death penalty. Id. at 440.
In his own grouping of "citizens who support egalitarianism and civic solidarity" and "citi-
zens who support hierarchy and individualism," however, there is an implicit identification of
shared values, motives, and ideals that underlie certain political positions. See id. at 489.
" 2 See supra notes 110-111.
"a See Kahan, supra note 26, at 489 (identifying the distinctions between "[c]itizens who
support egalitarianism and civic solidarity" and "citizens who support hierarchy and individu-
alism," while linking these groups to opposing views on hot-button social issues).
114 See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spi-
vak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967).
115 See generally Kahan, supra note 26. While Kahan does discuss the "true man" doc-
trine and situates its proponents on the conservative side, he does not mention the castle doc-
trine. However, proponents of "true man" laws tend to also support castle doctrine laws, so
much so that the two concepts tend to merge. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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But it is not obvious why Kahan's categories are the only ones availa-
ble. Once the discussion has broken free of its binary left/right prison and
has shifted its focus instead to the doctrine's philosophical justifications and
effects, possible alternative ideological mappings begin to emerge. 1 6 One
alternative would imagine the question of the authority of the state as a vehi-
cle of force to be the central question:
Statist Libertarian
Values order and stability Values personal liberties
Believes that the state must Believes that the state does not
preserve its monopoly on violence have the authority to use force
Supports the death penalty Opposes the death penalty
Opposes the castle doctrine Supports the castle doctrine
Another possible alternative ideological mapping could be formed
around the axis of criminalization. In this mapping, opposing the castle doc-
trine can be coded as supporting the explicit criminalization of certain con-
duct (i.e., the use of deadly force without retreat in the home):
16 The alternatives proposed here do not necessarily describe the way most people situate
themselves politically, but a consideration of the alternative narratives or ideological schemas
may cause people to reconsider their views on various doctrines. As noted above, Kahan draws
much of his framework from surveys and social scientific data, which are intended to represent
the way people actually think about these different policy issues. See supra note 111. That
said, it is also important to note the limited sample size of any such survey. Cf James E.
Bartlett, II et al., Organizational Research: Determining Appropriate Sample Size in Survey
Research, 19 INFo. TECH., LEARNING & PERFORMANCE J. 43, 43-44 (2001). Indeed, one of the
primary flaws in the dichotomous right/left, Democrat/Republican schema in considering po-
litical ideology in the United States is the low rate of voter turnout and the statistically unim-
pressive number of people registered as members of the two major parties. See Editorial,
Extreme Partisanship Isn't Serving the Public, GREELEY ThIB. (Colo.), Feb. 3, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.greeleytribune.conarticle/20100203/OPINION/ 00209923&parentprofile
=search ("There are about 55 million registered Republicans, 72 million registered Democrats
and 42 million registered independents .. "); cf Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of the Am.
Electorate, Am. Univ., African-Americans, Anger, Fear and Youth Propel Turnout to Highest
Level Since 1964 (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://timeswampland.files.wordpress.com/
2008/12/2008tumout-reportjfinal 1 .pdf ("The turnout level [in the 2008 presidential election]
was 63 percent of eligibles, a 2.4 percentage point increase over 2004 and the highest percent-
age to turn out since 64.8 percent voted for president in 1960.").
Some political commentators and theorists posit that this is at least in part because most
Americans fall in the center of the political spectrum. See, e.g., David Postman, Party Ties
Mean Less As Voters Shift Their Allegiance, SEAT-LE Tu,4Es, Jan. 19, 2009, at AI (declaring
that "[t]he middle is back," in discussing the importance of independent voters in the 2008
presidential election). But another possible explanation is that those who have traditionally
been politically inactive may simply fall on different ideological arcs than those espoused by
the major political parties. That is, instead of falling on the curve that Kahan uses to connect
the plotted points of the death penalty, gun control, etc., which is described in terms of "com-
munity" or "individualism," they may fall along an alternate curve with a different philosophy
or a different set of priorities.
A Defensible Defense?
Pro-Criminalization Anti-Criminalization
Believes in criminal statutes as a Believes that the criminal law may
means of enforcing societal norms not be the appropriate place to
and discouraging or punishing address broader societal concerns
aberrant behavior and that criminalization should be
a vehicle of last resort
Supports the "war on drugs" Opposes criminal sanctions for the
use or sale of narcotics
Favors strong gun control Opposes strict gun control statutes
legislation
Opposes the castle doctrine Supports the castle doctrine
One could, of course, continue to add doctrines and contested issues to
these mappings and produce alternative binaries. What is important to recog-
nize, however, in considering the potential for indeterminacy in the align-
ment of ideology, sociopolitical views, and legal doctrine is that simply
because one set of justifications is the current norm, it is not necessarily the
only set of justifications, or even the best or most persuasive.
In addition, it is important to remain aware of what values are actually
being advanced by the castle doctrine. Using Kahan's mapping, one side of
the castle doctrine debate would be characterized as egalitarian and the other
as hierarchical."' But once one has considered alternative ideological map-
pings, it becomes less clear that the anti-castle doctrine camp is the more
egalitarian and the pro-castle doctrine camp is the more hierarchical. For
example, assuming that there are hierarchies or inequalities inherent in the
criminal justice system, then it would seem that, under the second alternative
mapping offered above, the pro-criminalization camp would be the one tend-
ing to reinforce hierarchy, even though it would also be the camp favoring
abolition of the castle doctrine." 8
V. EXPRESSIVE INDETERMINACY AND THE EFFECTS OF THE
CASTLE DOCTRINE
The societal understanding of the castle doctrine has been firmly rooted
in a set of cultural tropes and ideological assumptions." 9 This Part will gen-
erally discuss the risks that come with attempting to link a specific doctrine
with a specific ideology or specific cultural politics-in particular, the risk
of ignoring the effects of the doctrine. It will then argue for a shift in focus
".
7 See supra note 111.
"' It is also important to consider the possibility that beliefs on one side of a dichotomy
may shift over time or with an alteration in the political landscape. In fact, these oppositions
may even cease to be affectively descriptive with political change. See, e.g., CARL SCHMrrT,
THE CONCEPT OF THE POLMCAL 75 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, 2d ed. 1996).
" 9 See supra Part IV.
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away from ideological and cultural framing and toward the actual effects of
the law and whether those effects are socially desirable.
In his exhaustive and highly politicized trilogy on the frontier myth in
American society, cultural historian Richard Slotkin insists that this cultural
myth, like any other, does not exist in a vacuum and does not have a single
meaning. 20 The frontier myth can be manipulated by any group or ideology
to achieve a desired result. As Professor Slotkin explains in discussing the
role of Western myth in the 1960s,
Nor was the language of the myth the peculiar property of the
"hawkish" factions of our political culture. Its terms were as fa-
miliar to left as to right, and were every bit as useful in lending
political resonance and traditional justification to particular politi-
cal stances and gestures . . . . [T]he adoption of "tribal" life-styles
as a form of communalism untainted by political associations with
communism, ... the linkage of political and ecological concerns,
the withdrawal to wilderness refuges and the adoption of an out-
law or "renegade" stance toward the larger society-all of these
phenomena so special to the sixties were acted out as if they were
not innovative at all, but merely repetitions of an older pattern.21
This same kind of re-appropriation is apparent today in the use of the fron-
tier image by traditionally left-leaning environmental groups'22 and tradition-
ally right-wing militarist groups.'23 Thus, there is no reason to think that
because one side of the castle doctrine debate evokes the language of the
frontier, the castle doctrine must be inherently conservative. Cultural myths
generally provide only a limited set of either/or choices; as a result, focusing
too much on the frontier myth in the context of the castle doctrine debate
brings with it the risk of becoming trapped in false dichotomies and over-
simplified political rhetoric.
12 4
Professor Richard Brown's history of duty to retreat laws, with its focus
on the conservative uses of the "true man" doctrine, illustrates the ideologi-
cal confusion that can result from an attempt to code along a single unam-
biguous political axis. 25 Although Brown tends to characterize duty to
retreat as a more liberal/leftist/progressive doctrine than the ruggedly indi-
121 See SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 109, at 17-47.
121 Id. at 17.
122 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA'S WILDERNESS, LET'S LEAVE AN ENDURING LEGACY
OF WILD SPACES, available at http://leaveitwild.org/docs/CAW-brochure.pdf ("Wilderness has
long shaped us as individuals and helped build us into a strong nation.").
"'
2 3 See, e.g., D.J. MULLOY, AMERICAN ExTREMIsM: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE MILITIA
MOVEMENT 138-39 (2004) (discussing the reliance on frontier mythos and its image of
"Americanness" among members of the contemporary militia movement).
124 See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 124 (Annette Levers trans., Hill & Wang
1984) (1957); SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 109, at 17-19.
'25 Cf BROWN, supra note 25, at 161 (describing McCarthyism and anti-communist cold
war attitudes as examples of the application of the no duty to retreat ethos).
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vidualist "true man" concept, 26 he identifies a major standoff in the area of
Mussel Slough, California 27 as one of America's most remarkable and
bloody no duty to retreat scenarios. In this conflict between small farmers
and a highly corporatized national railroad, the townsfolk, refusing to retreat,
stood their ground against a band of mercenaries hired by the railroad.1 21 In
the framework of the castle doctrine, the townspeople occupied the position
of the home dweller, while the railroad occupied the position of the intruder.
In this situation, it becomes very difficult to argue that there is something
inherently conservative about allowing the farmers to stand up to the rail-
roads. In other words, in this case, the left/right ideological mapping of duty
to retreat doctrine does not coincide with the traditional left/right ideological
mapping of perceptions of big business.
Thus, attempts at cultural mapping that seek to situate the castle doc-
trine in a specific political ideology are inherently flawed because they as-
sume a particular set of immutable background conditions.1 29 The castle
doctrine homeowner may be John White, the grandson of Klan violence vic-
tims, or a small farmer resisting corporate bullying. The point is not that
criminal law should favor one ideological group over another, but rather that
it is dangerous to assume that the effects of a law will necessarily mirror the
philosophical justifications or the political position of its supporters.
In the popular media and in scholarly criticism alike, the imagery asso-
ciated with the castle doctrine is that of a Southern, white, gun-toting male
shooting a nonwhite intruder. 130 The much-cited case of Joe Horn, the Texan
who shot two Latino men whom he saw breaking into a neighbor's home, 3'
does indeed provide a compelling image in support of this critical cultural
narrative. But is Horn's case the norm or an aberration? 3 2 Does the fact that
the few cases that captivate the public's imagination fall along certain racial,
126 See id.
27 See id. at 87-127.
128 Id.
129 Cf Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. Q. 470, 472-73. Hale asserts that the scope of a given law's effects is necessarily
dependent on the law's societal context (background conditions). See id. In particular, every
labor contract is ultimately reliant on other background property laws that require the laborer
to have money in order to live. See id.
130 See, e.g., SUK, supra note 28, at 77 (discussing the male focus of the castle doctrine);
Ross, supra note 25, at 35-37 ("These new statutes present potential danger for society at
large, but they particularly endanger racial minorities."); Thornburgh, supra note 18; The
O'Reilly Factor: Talking Points: The Deaths of Two Illegal Aliens Near Houston (FOX News
television broadcast Dec. 6, 2007) (highlighting the race and national origin of Joe Horn's
victims as the most noteworthy element of the shootings); cf. Brad Bumsted, A Rally, a Ban-
ner, a Controversy, PrrrSBURGH TRIB. REV., Apr. 29, 2007, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/news/election/s 505007.html (linking a potential threat to lynch a Latino
lawmaker with a group of castle doctrine supporters).
"' See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Shootings Test Limits of New Self-Defense Law, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 13, 2007, at A32; Imaeyen lbanga, Joe Horn: Bravado, Fear Fueled My Actions,
ABC NEWS, July 2, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/storyid=5291506&
page= 1; Thornburgh, supra note 18.
132 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 131.
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gender, or socioeconomic lines justify the assumption that the doctrine's ap-
plication generally favors or disfavors a particular group?'33 Castle doctrine
statute supporters have challenged this normative view by evoking scenarios
of women fending off abusive partners or other situations of "weaker" law-
abiding persons threatened by physically more powerful invaders, 34 and
others have addressed the often perverse and undesirable consequences of
the castle doctrine in the context of domestic relations.'35 Moreover, home
invasions generally take place in low-income, urban areas, which are dispro-
portionately inhabited by citizens of color'36 and where police response time
may be greater than in more privileged areas.' Therefore, contrary to the
current cultural mapping of the castle doctrine, the doctrine may in fact ben-
efit underprivileged people more than it victimizes them.
133 In his discussion of public perceptions of racially disparate impact of criminal laws and
their enforcement, Professor Kennedy observes:
One must be careful to avoid speaking with undue confidence about inferences re-
garding law enforcement that are drawn from the character of media coverage. First,
even if media coverage suggests racial selectivity, that does not necessarily mean
that law enforcement officials are responding in a racially selective manner. Second,
even when it is the case that a crime featuring a white victim receives considerably
more media and police attention than a similar crime featuring black victims, there
remains the possibility that other, nonracial factors may be playing a role in the
differential treatment.
KENNEDY, supra note 84, at 72. Considering that most crimes in the United States are in-
traracial, id. at 23, and that low income black men are more likely to be the victims of crime
than any other demographic, MICHAEL R. RAND, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMI-
ZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008 4 (2009), there is reason to believe that there
is simply not a great appetite for reporting on such crimes, making them topics for "the back
pages of the local press" as opposed to "a page-one cause cjl~bre." KENNEDY, supra note 84,
at 72-73.
114 See, e.g., Interview by Renee Giachino with Marion Hammer, former NRA President
(Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/in-our_opinion/
marion-hammer-nra-interview.htm. In her defense of the Florida statute, Hammer describes
weak women being threatened with rape:
The duty to retreat had been imposed by the system and essentially if someone had
tried to drag a woman into an alley to rape her, the women [sic]-even though she
might be licensed to carry concealed and ready to protect herself, the law would not
allow her to do it.
Id.
I'" See, e.g., SUK, supra note 28, at 65-72, 80; Carpenter, supra note 48, at 669-85.
136 See, e.g., Garland F. White, Neighborhood Permeability and Burglary Rates, 7 JUST.
Q. 57, 64 (1990); Home Invasions Target the Have-Nots, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 26, 2009,
at Al ("An Indianapolis Star analysis of crime data over the past 2 1/2 years found that the
poorer the neighborhood, the more likely a home is to be the target of an armed break-in. And
if a neighborhood is heavily Hispanic, home invasions are even more frequent.").
"' See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1726
(2006); Thomas B. Priest & Deborah Brown Carter, Evaluations of Police Performance in an
African American Sample, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 457, 462-63 (1999) (presenting a study that dem-
onstrates generally negative perceptions of police response time in black neighborhoods); Cait-
lin Rother, Oxnard; City to Study Police Response Times, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, at B3
("La Colonia-area business operators . . . say that city police often do not respond to emer-
gency calls in the low-income neighborhood for up to an hour, if at all.").
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The castle doctrine is not unusual in being difficult to assess in view of
current social and racial inequities and entrenched prejudices. As discussed
supra, in Part III, the fundamental goal of a castle doctrine law is to preserve
life by guaranteeing the vulnerable home dweller the right to save him or
herself in situations where the state is unable to intervene. Is the doctrine
accomplishing this goal or has it disproportionately provided legitimacy to
unnecessary violence? Certainly, the evidence provided by social scientific
studies would be helpful in assessing castle doctrine laws. 3' Despite their
flaws, such studies would add an essential component to the discourse on the
castle doctrine: a focus on its effects. The doctrine, like all laws, has con-
crete effects, and this Note's effort to culturally remap the castle doctrine
would be incomplete without addressing those actual effects. 13 9 In other
words, producing a less draconian justification or a more appealing cultural
narrative for a problematic doctrine would not be sufficient to overcome
actual problematic consequences. In reshaping the discourse on the castle
doctrine, it is important to consider what it means in concrete terms to have
or not have the doctrine.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider the law that would govern home
invasion situations absent the castle defense. As a general rule, castle doc-
trine statutes, like the ones passed in Rhode Island and California, create a
presumption of reasonableness on the part of the defendant/home dweller,
which the prosecution must overcome.14° Because objective reasonableness
can be difficult to prove, the home dweller is more likely to be found guilty
without such a burden shift. Placing the burden on the defendant risks over-
inclusiveness, but placing the burden on the prosecution results in the oppo-
site risk and may ultimately protect violence-prone home dwellers who react
with disproportionate force to an innocent or mistaken invasion.
138 It is, of course, important to realize that statistical studies do not always have the power
to persuade in the face of contrary ideas deeply embedded in culture. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan
& Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Percep-
tions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (2003). Even more importantly, statistical studies themselves
are also open to interpretive biases. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN:
YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 222-29 (2006). In his analysis of different social scientific
studies, Professor Bernard Harcourt suggests that "leaps of faith" always occur as researchers
attempt to make their data confirm their theory or ideology. Id. at 229. Harcourt, in his work,
calls for a greater honesty about the existence of these leaps of faith and a recognition that
social scientific data is not a universal truth and that the interpretation of such data is colored
by personal ideology. Id. This Note's goal in evoking the possibility of empirical studies is not
to express disagreement with Harcourt (or Kahan) by arguing that these data would prove
conclusive or even that they would necessarily have the power to change the minds of those on
either side of the castle doctrine debate. Rather, this Note suggests that situating the discussion
in the framework of empirically traceable effects would at least acknowledge the possibility
that expressive qualities of the law can belie antithetical results.
'39 See generally Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986), re-
printed in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 753-75 (David Kennedy & William W.
Fisher III eds., 2006) (arguing that the law has life and death consequences and that legal
interpretation that focuses on law in the abstract and neglects its effects is both unrealistic and
insufficient).
"~ See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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But what is often missing from the discussion of the castle doctrine is
recognition that reliance on the reasonable person standard can also have a
price. The reasonable person standard often means the standard of the domi-
nant majority. Consequently, it has been criticized for exacerbating racial
and social distinctions and inequalities.' 41 It may be, for instance, that Joe
Horn, as a member of the culturally dominant group, would have been
judged a "reasonable person" when he shot two non-white strangers and
would have been acquitted under either the standard or the castle doctrine
rule. As a result, the abolition of the castle doctrine would not necessarily
affect the frequency of convictions for killings with this racial and socioeco-
nomic composition. But would John White-faced with racial fears unfamil-
iar to his white jurors-also be considered to have acted "reasonably?" In
other words, does the presence of a castle doctrine statute provide a check on
racial biases in these situations?
An instinctive reaction might be that even if castle doctrine legislation
were to provide such a check, such a check is undesirable. Perhaps, as many
critics conclude, society should not devalue human life by lowering the bar
on when deadly force is acceptable. 42 The strongest version of such an argu-
ment, pointing to the Model Penal Code, would assert that without a castle
doctrine, the duty to retreat would only apply when the home dweller
"knows that he can avoid the necessity of using . . . force with complete
safety by retreating."' 43 Many castle law states have adopted statutes making
such a standard the default for determining whether retreat is required in
situations outside of the home. For example, Hawaii's penal code section on
"[u]se of force in self-protection," borrows the Model Penal Code's lan-
guage and states that "[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
section if ... [tihe actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such
"' See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provo-
cation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1998).
142 See, e.g., G. Todd Butler, Recipe for Disaster: Analyzing the Interplay Between the
Castle Doctrine and the Knock-and-Announce Rule After Hudson v. Michigan, 27 Miss. C. L.
REv. 435, 435 (2008) ("[L]egislators should opt to protect human life by declining to provide
citizens with a 'shoot first, ask questions later' mentality."); Tresa Baldas, "Shoot First" Laws
Hit Courtrooms, DAILY REP. (FULTON COUNTY), July 11, 2006, at 10 ("Hagel opposes shoot-
first laws; he feels that such laws can lead to deadly mistakes . . . . 'Common law has always
said we always value human life more than your sense of manhood,' said Hagel."); Mary Elen
Klas, Law Would Expand the Right to Shoot, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 24, 2005, at B I ("Florida is
a state that 'has been very vigilant in preserving and valuing human life' but the legislation
'flies in the face of that value. This really encourages people to shoot first and ask questions
later.'" (quoting an assistant state attorney)); Rene Thompson, Letter to the Editor, "Shoot
First" Bill Allows Fear To Determine Value of a Life, CIN. POST, Mar. 22, 2006, at AI5 ("The
Kentucky Legislature wants to change that doctrine and, with it, the value of a human life in
the commonwealth.").
143 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1985). The Model Penal Code does include a
castle doctrine provision, but this section refers to the general duty to retreat outside of the
home as a means of demonstrating what the duty for the home dweller would be in a state that
had not adopted a castle law statute. See id.
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force with complete safety by retreating."' 14 On its face, the "complete
safety" standard appears to be a very high threshold for when the home
dweller is required to retreat instead of resorting to deadly force. 45 However,
the concept of "complete safety" may be more ambiguous in practice 46 and
may again lead to concerns about standards and their impact on socially non-
dominant groups.
One of the essential elements of complete safety would necessarily be
the ability to contact law enforcement and remain safe until officers ar-
rived. 147 If, for instance, John White could have retreated to a safe room in
his house from which he would have been able to call the police, this would
appear to fulfill a complete safety requirement-as long as there was reason
to believe that police officers would respond promptly. In John White's case,
there is no reason to believe that quick police response was impossible, and
in Joe Horn's case, police were actually en route to Horn's house when he
shot Hornando Torres and Miguel Antonio DeJesus. 148 However, there is sig-
nificant evidence that in the low-income, predominantly black inner-city
neighborhoods where the majority of burglaries occur, 149 police are per-
ceived as being less prompt or responsive to calls for help. 50 Under a rea-
sonableness analysis, therefore, the ability to call the police should not
negate the ability to resort to force if calling the police is not considered
"completely safe" by those who are most likely to invoke a castle law's
protection.
Granted, the inadequacy of police responsiveness in inner-city neigh-
borhoods may not lead one to conclude that residents should be allowed to
resort to violence quickly and with impunity. But it is important to recognize
police responsiveness as a concern to be addressed by anti-castle doctrine
arguments. Because inhabitants of inner-city neighborhoods are often under-
represented on juries,' 5' rejecting the expansive presumptions of the home
dweller's reasonableness that are central to many of the new castle doctrine
statutes may well result in guilty verdicts for inner-city defendants even if
they behave in ways that are reasonable in the context of their communities.
All of this is not to say that the existence of castle laws is necessarily
positive or that opponents of the doctrine are necessarily incorrect in their
objections. Rather, this Note argues that the rejection (or, for that matter, the
4 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703-304(4) (2007).
145See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 780-81
(8th ed. 2007) (providing a series of hypothetical situations in which a person could easily
retreat instead of killing an aggressor in his or her home but is not legally obligated to do so).
46 See, e.g., Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990) (declining to impose a
duty to retreat because of the potential difficulty faced by jurors in determining "complete
safety").
1 See generally KADISH ET AL., supra note 145, at 80.
'"See Blumenthal, supra note 131.
"9 See, e.g., supra note 136.
"'°See supra note 137; KENNEDY, supra note 84, at 71.
'5' See KENNEDY, supra note 84, at 232-37.
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adoption) of castle doctrine laws may have far more complicated effects than
the current political debate suggests. Even the observations about the racial
and economic politics of the castle doctrine lead to another round of difficult
questions. For example, some might argue that, even if the reasonable person
standard leads to disproportionate incarcerations of members of low-income
communities, such incarcerations might provide those very low-income
communities with an offsetting benefit by encouraging a generally more
peaceful environment. 5 2 But without actual study of the castle doctrine's ap-
plication to various demographic populations, such questions are too easily
brushed aside in favor of broad assumptions drawn from cultural politics.
For those who oppose the castle doctrine and who are uncomfortable with
"the wrong side" of the artificial ideological framings presented supra, in
Part II, it is important to consider these questions, to recognize the true
flaws of the castle doctrine, and to inquire whether ideological critiques re-
ally reflect the doctrine's effects.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cultural framing and the philosophical justifications for the castle
doctrine need not be monolithic and can just as easily be seen from the left
as the right. Because of this, an ideological drive to oppose castle laws be-
cause they represent a "true man," cowboy ethos should be tempered or at
least be supported by proof that there are in fact disproportionately negative
effects of castle doctrine laws. Dean Kadish has written that "the criminal
law is a highly specialized tool of social control, useful for certain purposes
but not for others; that when improperly used ... is capable of producing
more evil than good."' 53 In the case of the castle doctrine, this delicate bal-
ancing requires a greater understanding of the true effects of the law.' Even
if empirical studies about the impact of castle doctrine upon various demo-
graphic groups would not be dispositive, such an engagement with the castle
doctrine's effects would at least force a reorientation of the current policy
debates. The castle doctrine laws raise many difficult questions, but these
15 While one's personal views on criminalization would necessarily have a strong impact
on these questions, Kennedy argues that they are essential to understanding and analyzing the
racial politics of disparate impact. He questions:
Whether, or for whom, such a disparity is harmful.... [Ils the black population hurt
when traffickers in crack cocaine suffer longer prison sentences than those who deal
in powdered cocaine or helped by incarcerating for longer periods those who use and
sell a drug that has an especially devastating effect on African-American
communities?
Id. at 10.
... Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALs Am. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 157, 169 (1967).
'5 As the study for the Connecticut General Assembly points out, "We could not find any
studies on the impact of these laws." REINHART, supra note 62, at 2.
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issues should be addressed through a realist lens, recognizing that a drive to
eliminate castle doctrine laws may not be in the best interest of home dwell-
ers, even those who do not fit the "true man" stereotype.

